| Title Page Previous Next Contents | PERSECUTION OF THE PEOPLE |
During the summer of 1940, political surveillance and repressions were carried out by an Operative Group of the People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs (the NKVD), although nominally speaking, the actions were initiated by the structures of the Republic of Estonia that had been taken over by the USSR that is to say the Political Police and the office of the Chief of Internal Security. The first to be arrested were ranking politicians (above all both the serving and earlier Ministers of the Interior, who were accused of having fought the communists), national and local leaders of the Home Guard, and some state officials. Members of Russian White Guard organizations and persons accused of spying on the USSR in the interests of third countries came under special scrutiny. The Chief of Internal Security Harald Haberman issued orders to have the previous heads of the Political Police arrested, as well as some lower-ranking officials. On June 23, 1940, the Assistant to the Minister of the Interior August Tuulse and his wife committed suicide. On July 21, 1940, the Attorney-at-Law Theodor Rõuk, who had been the Ministry of the Interior in 1924, killed himself before being arrested.
The offices of the Chief of Internal Security were employed in the case of lesser crimes directed against the occupation forces. Most of the individuals thus targeted were accused of using offensive language in reference to the Soviet Union, Soviet power or Soviet troops. For example: on July 2, criminal charges were brought against Andres Raska for having distributed blue, black and white ribbons to pin on lapels (NB! even though at that point, on July 2, the tricolor was still formally in the status of the Estonian flag of state).
Once the Constitution of the ESSR was adopted on August 25, 1940, the puppet government of Johannes Vares was dissolved, and the administrative hierarchy in Estonia was reorganized to bring it into alignment with the state structure of the USSR. In a move paralleling the way that functions were distributed in the USSR, the Security Administration of the People's Commissariat for Interior Affairs assumed the role of a political police structure, and as such, it was the primary agency that carried out political repressions. During March and April of 1941, the state security apparat was made an independent Peoples Commissariat headed by Boris Kumm. Arrests were authorized by Kumm and sanctioned by the Prosecutor of the ESSR. The Prosecutor also chose the agency that would hear the charges against the accused. The target group of arrestees began to grow. Attention was focused on a large cross-section of persons who by virtue of their social background, job descriptions, membership in social organizations or their previous activities could be assumed to have a hostile attitude towards bolshevism and the Soviet Union. Once war broke out between Germany and the USSR, the represssion of military personnel, draft evaders and parties suspected of espionage increased.
Until the end of June 1940, the Tribunal of the Leningrad Military District decided the cases of arrestees. Subsequently, other tribunals passed verdicts, including those of the forces of the Baltic District of the NKVD. Most of the time, the proceedings took place behind closed doors, with neither the prosecutor nor a defender present.
After the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR, the nature of political repressions began to change. Initially, the Peoples Commissariat for State Security of the ESSR continued to arrest people and carry out investigations, but it was the tribunals of Red Army and Red Banner Baltic Fleet units stationed in Estonia that now began to be tasked with rendering verdicts.
In addition to the tribunals, the Prosecutor would also pass some cases (along with recommendations concerning sentencing) on to Special Councils of the NKVD of the USSR in Moscow.
Of the civil courts, only the court at the highest level the Supreme Court of the ESSR was permitted to reach verdicts regarding political crimes, but this was the exception rather than the rule. In the case of prisoners evacuated from Estonia to the USSR, Criminal Colleagueships of Oblast Courts were responsible for reaching verdicts.
At least 300 persons were sentenced to death during 19401941 by special tribunals operating in Estonia approximately half of them before the beginning of the war. Most of the shootings took place in Tallinn or nearby. For example, on June 23, 1941, people were executed in Tallinn. Groups of three or more prisoners sentenced to death were taken from General Prison Nr. 1 (the Patarei prison) to the internal compound of the Pagari Street prison as ordered in writing by Boris Kumm, the Peoples Commissar for Security or one of his two deputies. The prisoners were handed over to the Chief Warden and Commandant of the Internal Prison and a detail of guards. The heads of the 1
st, 2nd and 3rd Sections of the Peoples Commissariat for State Security of the ESSR were present at the executions. The firing squad was commanded by the Commandant of the Internal Prison A. Brenner and Sergei Kingisepp, the Director of the 3rd Section of the Peoples Commissariat for State Security.In addition to those executed by the order of tribunals and Special Councils, a number of people were simply executed without court decisions. The names of 2,199 persons who were executed during the period of June to October 1941 (after the beginning of the war between Germany and the USSR) have been ascertained to date. Those executed without the decision of a military tribunal or a Special Assembly can be divided into two large groups:
In the Soviet Union in 1940 the Law on the Judicial System in the Republics and Autonomous Regions of the USSR was enacted, which established a uniform and equal case management basis for all citizens, and based on the Constitution, declared the independence of the courts and their subordination exclusively to the law. Regarding the organization of the courts, the collectivity (participation of public assessors), openness (public nature of the court proceedings), and principle of court appeal was specified. But the clause
except in cases specified by the law was added to every paragraph.In the case of state political repressions, this additional clause provided a legal basis for waiving compliance with democratic judicial principles, but at that same time, to giving a judicial form to political repressions with lower level legislation. In the Soviet judicial system, special courts also operated: military tribunals, railroad circuit courts, and waterway circuit courts, which were not subordinated to the supreme court of the republic, but reported directly to the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union. According to the court code, the war tribunals deliberated [...] military crimes as well as other crimes coming under their jurisdiction [...].
Different types of military tribunals also passed judgment on a large portion of the people sent to prison camp or condemned to execution for political reasons in Estonia in 194041: until the start of the war between the Soviet Union and Germany, primarily by the Baltic district tribunal of the NKVD forces; after the declaration of martial law on Estonian territory, by the military tribunals of the different local Red Army units, the Baltic Sea fleet, the border guards and the railroad. As a rule, the sessions of the special courts were closed.
The code of the judicial system emphasizes that the courts determine justice. Even so, Special Councils that were outside of the court system also decided cases of a criminal nature. In their work, the Special Councils implemented punishment specified by the criminal code, but operated on an administrative basis (court proceedings as such did not take place, the members of the Special Councils made their decisions based on written material without having seen or heard the accusers or the defenders). The activities of the Special Councils were formally based on laws and governmental decrees, but their activities were in conflict with the elementary principles of justice: the right of everyone to be heard by the court, the right to defend oneself against accusations, the right to appeal the decision of the court. The Special Councils that operated in this manner can be called state-organized quasi-judicial organs.
The implementation of extra-judicial institutions was justified by the reasoning that it was necessary to implement repressions against anti-Soviet elements, even without the possession of concrete evidentiary material.
The 1936 Soviet Constitution specified the composition and assignments of the Prosecutors Office. The supreme supervision of the Soviet Peoples Commissariats and its subordinate institutions, as well as of the loyalty of officials and citizens, was assigned to the Soviet Prosecutor.
From the standpoint of political repressions, the most important activity of the Prosecutor was to supervise and sanction NKVD activity. A special sector was prescribed in the prosecutorial system, which was assigned to supervise the activities of the NKVD/NKGB institutions. This role was minimal in practice. A deputy prosecutor for special matters, and the special department who was subordinated to him was assigned to sanction the arrest decrees of the NKVD/NKGB, to confirm the summary of the charges and to legally process them. The prosecutors for special matters formed a separate category in the system. People who were especially trustworthy and obedient to the regime were chosen for these jobs, and their candidacies were approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or according to the hierarchy, at lower levels of the Party organization. Its functions and practical activities were more closely tied to the NKVD/NKGB than to the Prosecutors Office.
There were two sides to the activities of the Prosecutors Office. On one hand, they were to supervise and guarantee general legality, including in the security and court systems. On the other hand, the Prosecutors Office concealed the unlawful activities of the NKVD/NKGB when arresting and interrogating people, sanctioned their arrests, and confirmed fabricated charges, as well as presented them to the courts. There were prosecutors who, using their rights, tried to protest against illegal activities, but they were removed from their jobs and their decisions were annulled. To create a propagandistic reality, the prosecutors made public appearances, where they harshly demanded and proclaimed adherence to Soviet legality.
According to the Soviet Constitution, the accused were guaranteed the right to a defense. In the case of political accusations, this had no practical meaning.
On August 17, 1940, after the incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR, the Peoples Commissar for Defense Semyon Timoshenko ordered that the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian armed forces be reformed into Territorial Rifle Corps. It was directed that each Corps was to have an authorized strength of 15,142 men. They were to consist of two divisions, each consisting of 6,000 troops, and other units. These Corps were to exist for one year, during which period they were to be purged of disloyal elements, and the men had to learn Russian and the regulations of the Red Army. Thereafter these Corps were to be reorganized once again, on a non-territorial basis.
The Estonian Armed Forces were formed into the 22nd Estonian Territorial Rifle Corps. Major General Gustav Jonson (who had previously been the Commander of the Armed Forces in the Soviet-imposed government of Johannes Vares) was appointed to be the Commander of the Corps. Major General Richard Tomberg was appointed Commander of the 180th Rifle Division, and Major General Jaan Kruus was appointed to command the 182nd Rifle Division. In June of 1941, the Corps was sent to the Värska Training Camp, where approximately 300 senior officers were arrested on June 1314, with most of them being sent from there to the Norilsk Prison Camp. The top-ranking officers of the Corps had been sent to Russia before them, purportedly to receive refresher courses. There, most of them were also arrested. Major General Aleksander Ksenofontov was now appointed to be the Commander of the Corps, with Colonels (Polkovniks) I. Missan and J. Kuroshev each assuming command of one of the two divisions of the Corps. At the beginning of the war, conscripts from the Soviet Union were mobilized into the Corps, bringing it up to its full authorized strength of 29,000 men. The Corps was subordinated to the 11th Army of the Southeastern Front and fought in the Pskov and Staraya-Russa area from July 4 to August 22. There were about 5,500 Estonians in the Corps at that time. The Corps suffered heavy casualties during battles that took place in August. Most of the Estonians were taken prisoner or defected to the German side. At the end of 1941, they were sent back to Estonia from the prisoner of war camps they had been held in. Many of these men volunteered for service in the security battalions of the German Army. The remaining Estonians in the Red Army were pulled back from the front in the fall, since they were considered unreliable, and were transferred to labor battalions.
On December 18, 1941, the State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union directed that the 7th Estonian Rifle Division was to begin to be formed on December 25 in the Ural Military District, with an authorized strength of 11,618 men. In February of 1942, the 249th Estonian Rifle Division also began to be formed, and in September 1942, work began on forming the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps on the basis of these divisions.
On November 7, 1942, the 8th Estonian Tallinn Rifle Corps was put on active status and integrated into the regular structure of the Red Army. On December 10, 1942, the roster of the Corps consisted of 32,463 men, including the 19th Guards Division, and the 85th Artillery Batallion, both of which had been subordinated to the Corps. Neither of these latter units had Estonians in their ranks. The Corps was brought under the command of the Kalinin Front and was sent into combat at Velikije Luki. The Commander of the Corps was Major General Lembit Pärn, with Colonel (Polkovnik) August Vassil in command of the 7th Division, and Colonel (Polkovnik) Artur Saueselg in command of the 249th Division.
The return of the Soviet occupation in Estonia in the fall of 1944 did not bring peace. Instead, it was accompanied as had been anticipated by a number of new waves of repressions. Before the beginning of this new Soviet occupation, approximately 70,000 persons fled to other countries in anticipation of the worst, because of what they had experienced in 1941. Their fears were realized. 10,000 persons were imprisoned in 1944 and 1945, half of whom died within two years. Very large numbers of people were sent to prisons and forced labor camps in post-war Estonia. Imprisonment was a major form of repression of individuals, second only to new deportations. New forms of charges were leveled: treason, providing aid to the Germans, performance of service in the German Armed Forces or in the actions arranged by the civil administration, attempts to flee the homeland, etc. During the years to come, the family members of most of those who had been arrested were deported.
The first wave of post-war ethnic cleansing involved the deportation of Germans on August 15, 1945. There were 261 citizens of German origin among the 407 deportees, while the remaining 146 persons belonged to other ethnic groups. Most of these were Estonians who voluntarily accompanied those family members, who were being sent away. In most cases, the deportees were Germans who had repatriated to Germany during 1939 and 1940. Having returned to Estonia during the German occupation, they had not succeeded in departing Estonia before the advance of the Red Army.
In Russia, deportations as political campaigns have a long tradition. Soviet Russia started in 1919 with the deportation of the Cossacks, and the repressions of the 1930s that were carried out in the course of collectivization are well known. In this way, national and social groups, which had been chosen as targets, were subordinated to state terror, a terror of this magnitude was meant to create a constant sense of fear among the people, and thereby make them submissive to the ruling regime. In the 1930s the cleansing of the western borders of the Soviet Union commenced; in March of that year, a 22-km area along the border of the Leningrad oblast was almost totally freed of socially dangerous residents. Similar operations were repeated in 193536. Thousands of Estonians who lived on the territory of the Soviet Union were also repressed during these operations.
A new wave of deportations started in 1940, when the Soviet Union occupied Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. These areas were cleansed of Poles and foreign citizens. From February to June 1940, about 276,000 people were deported from these areas. The next campaign, in the spring and summer of 1941, also included the territories of Moldavia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which had meanwhile been occupied.
The end of the war in 1945 brought new repressions instead of peace and stability. The victims included everyone who had shown a readiness to cooperate in any manner with the German authorities in the areas that had been occupied by Germany. Mass deportations continued until the middle of the 1950s, encompassing a total of 6 million Soviet residents. This does not include war prisoners, or those who had been taken to work in the Third Reich, about 3.2 million people, and who were repatriated during the first months after the war and sent into exile directly from the filtration camps.
The third means of deportation special deportation (
??????????? ?????????) was implemented for those who, by governmental decree, were sent to locations controlled by security organs, either forever or for a specific period. Most of the deportees from Estonia belonged to this category, although with some exceptions: Those convicted and deported in 194041 belonged to the group without a term, while those deported in 1949 and thereafter were among those who were exiled forever. Also included in the category of people sent into exile forever were Germans (also those who returned to the Soviet Union during the course of repatriation), foreigners, and stateless people, the Kalmyks, Chechens, the Ingush, Turks exiled from Georgia, Kurds, the Crimean Tartars exiled from Crimea, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, partisans exiled from Ukraine (1944), along with their helpers and family members. The list would become too drawn out if we were to mention all those who belonged to this category.
The 1941 deportations from Estonia were part of the cleansing operations in the newly occupied areas along the Soviet Unions western border. The direct decision for mass repressions in Estonia was made in the first half of May 1941, with joint decree No. 1299526ss of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Soviet of the Peoples Commissariat that was entitled Measures for Cleansing the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs of Anti-Soviet and Socially Dangerous Elements. Politicians, higher officials, military men, members of the Defense League, police officers, entrepreneurs, landowners and their families were among the primary repression victims.
The collection of information on possible political enemies had started immediately after the occupation of Estonia. For this purpose, archives were purposefully examined, agents recruited from all possible walks of life, and simple accusations an inappropriate anecdote, subversive story, etc. were fixed.
An important role was played by the Communist Party, which informed the local party leaders, and through them, recruited Party and Communist Youth League activists to directly participate in the operation. Functionaries from the Communist Party headquarters were sent to the countryside during the execution of the operation to implement Party control.
According to information to date, up to 10,861 people were captured during the operations in June and July. Of these, a couple of hundred were killed before being deported; the men were arrested and sent to prison camps; the women and children deported. Although allegedly so-called anti-Soviet elements were being dealt with, over 1/3 of the deportees were minors.
On June 17
th, the trains, with 490 wagons in all, left Estonia by way of Narva and Irboska. The majority of the deportees were taken to the Kirov and Novosibirsk oblasts. 60% of the women and children died of hunger, cold and illness, and over 90% of the men arrested and sent to the GULAG were killed or died in the camps.
On January 29, 1949, the USSR Soviet of Ministers adopted decree No. 390138ss, which obligated the USSR State Security Ministry (SSM) to exile forever the kulaks and peoples enemies from the territory of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian SSRs. To fulfill the decree, the SSM was to guarantee the detention of the deportees and their delivery to the stations, the USSR Interior Ministry (IM) was responsible for the convoy and transportation of the deportees. They were also responsible for guarding the deportees on the journey, for administrative supervision at the destination and employment in Siberia.
Lieutenant General Pjotr Burmak, head of the USSR SSM Internal Forces was named to head the operation. A temporary headquarters was organized in Riga, and First Deputy of the USSR Security Minister Ogoltsov was sent, who started to receive detailed information on the progress of the operation. Lieutenant General Afanassi Blinov, Deputy of the USSR Security Minister was sent to Tallinn, and Lieutenant General Nikolai Gorlinski, Deputy of Security Minister was sent to Vilnius. In Estonia, Boriss Kumm, the ESSR Minister of Security and Major General Jermolin, the USSR SSM representative in the Estonian SSR, who commanded a 12-member operational staff that carried out orders, coordinated the deportations.
According to Kumms plan, 1,987 operational groups
were to be organized to carry out the operation, these included 2,611 operative agents,
2,867 men from SSM and IM forces, 3,053 fighters from the Destruction Battalions and 9,375
local activists and checked collective farmers, who were partially armed and dealt mainly
with giving instructions, as well as recording and expropriating the possessions of the
deportees. About 6,000 operative agents and soldiers were brought to Estonia from outside.
The events at the locations were conducted under the direction of security operative
agents. On March 24th, the Party Committees mobilized Party members, Communist Youth and
other activists using Party meetings or training as an excuse. The assembled were given
their instructions immediately before the beginning of the operation.
Between 9 pm and 5 am during the night before March 25th, the troop trains waiting in
Pskov and Gatshina stations were directed to loading stations in Estonia. Operation
Priboi started in the early morning of March 25th; at 4 am in the capitals; at 6 am in the
countryside. The operation was to be completed within 72 hours.
In Estonia, 19 troop trains were formed to transport the deportees. Of these nine troop trains were directed to Novosibirsk oblast, six troop trains to Karsnoyarsk krai, two to Omsk oblast, and two to Irkutsk oblast. About 21,000 people in total were deported from Estonia, of whom the most numerous were 7 year olds. A little over 10% were men of working age. About 15% were older then 60, including some over 90. The deported included invalids, pregnant women and children exiled without their parents.
Collective farms
(Russian, kollektivnoje hozjaistvo) were the main form of agricultural production in the Soviet Union. Simply explained, a collective farm was a group of people who were supposed to till the fields together, to own common means of production and divide the income equally. Under the ruling totalitarian regime in the Soviet Union, however, this idea turned out to be a farce. The peasants were forced to relinquish their land and means of production and join collective farms. There were no alternatives and resistance was punished. The collective farms were totally subordinated to the authority of the state and the Party; there was not the least bit of self-initiative or joint action. Everywhere they turned into badly managed collectives of extremely impoverished people. The collective farmers worked almost without compensation, while theoretically being owners and entrepreneurs. Since formally, collective farms corresponded to Communist ideology, then on principle, the Communist regime did not want to change anything. The deeper economic concept behind the collective farm system was to totally drain the rural economy through mandatory sales obligations and taxes in order to get resources for the industrialization of the state, for the building up of heavy and war industries. The collectivization regime was also the lever with which the regime totally subordinated a large part of society the peasants to its will.During 194041, the first year of Soviet occupation, the new authority did not get around to collectivizing the farms in Estonia. A few collective farms were organized in the Russian villages in the border areas of Estonia. After the re-occupation of Estonian territory in 1944, collectivization was not hurried, because the authority the Communist Party (CP) representatives assigned to positions in the countryside was still weak and the implementation of the collectivization system, which was unpopular with Estonians, would have weakened it further. In order to win the support of certain segments of society, the land reform, which had not been completed in 1940, was completed. The reform was an attempt to show the farmers that the new authority was interested in the preservation of private farms, even the creation of new small farms, and it did not plan to create collective farms. At the same time, however, a progressive tax system was implemented, that decreed higher taxes for farms with more arable land. It was hoped that this tax system would be the main means of coercion for creating collective farms. The mandatory state purchase prices for the sales quotas were kept low by the central authorities. In this way, an artificial system was created, whereby the production capability of the farms was not sufficient to pay the taxes. The farms developed debts and tax debts incurred criminal liability. The farmers that ran into difficulties had no alternative but to relinquish their farms and animals. This entire farce was undertaken by the CP in order to make it seem that the creation of the collective farms was voluntarily. In order to understand this today, one must know that it was very important for the ruling regime in the Soviet Union to demonstrate that everything happening in the country occurred naturally and according to the will of the people, and at the same time, to conceal its true malevolence that actually aimed to control the entire society.
The decision to begin the collectivization of the farm economy in the Baltic republics was approved by the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee in May of 1947. According to the written word, the creation of the collective farms was to be voluntary and for ideological reason, and the first collective farms were to be formed by the owners of small farms. The owners of large farms, or kulaks, were, by nature, antagonistic to Soviet authority, and were not to be allowed on collective farms. The first collective farm in the ESSR was established on August 23, 1947 in Saaremaa and named after Viktor Kingissepp. From the beginning, the creation of collective farms progressed with difficulty. In December of 1947, the ECP Central Committee reported to the CPSU Central Committee that, of 17 planned collective farms; it has been possible to establish only 5. Although more were added in January of 1948, this did not improve the situation. Not a single collective farm had been established in Virumaa, Viljandimaa or Hiiumaa by that time.
The breakthrough in collectivization was made by the March deportations of 1949. Forcing farmers into collective farms was the main goal of these deportations, and this was successfully accomplished. An atmosphere of total terror was created by the deportations. The massive creation of collective farms already started on the day of the deportations, when cars drove around the countryside. The choice was simple and clear, into a collective farm here or in Siberia. The collectivization took on such a pace that it surpassed the collectivization tempo of Soviet Russia in the 1920s. By the end of the year, 70% of farms had been collectivized. The remainder was the small farms whose owners didnt have reason to fear being labeled kulaks and to be sent to Siberia, and who had some other source of income that helped them to pay the agricultural taxes. With the implementation of new higher tax rates in January of 1950, this portion was also eliminated. By the middle of 1950, already 82 percent of the farms were collectivized, and by the end of the year, this rose to 92 percent. With this, the state authority could consider collectivization to be complete.
After the 1924 uprising, Communist activities had been successfully curbed in the Republic of Estonia and the underground activities of the Estonian Communist Party (ECP) were marginal. In 1938, the Communists who had been imprisoned earlier were granted amnesty. The number of underground Communists in Estonia before June of 1940, totaled 120130, considerably less than in Latvia (about 400) or Lithuania (1,220). The first new members were accepted at the end of June and the beginning of July, when the Party was formally still an illegal organization. Among the first were: Neeme Ruus, Nigol Andresen, Johannes Vares-Barbarus. Apparently according to a plan from Moscow, the number of party members was to be increased to 1,500 by August 1. The sudden increase in the number of Party members was undoubtedly part of the rapid Sovietization of Estonia in July that was announced by danov. In addition to the simplified acceptance of new members, the rush also resulted in a so-called open door policy. By the middle of August, the necessary number of Party members had been recruited, and rapid mobilization was replaced with the normal strictly regulated procedures. This, however, caused new problems, and in order to solve the situation, on March 10, 1941, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee approved the acceptance of temporary procedures in the Baltic states. Communists arriving from the Soviet Union were given the opportunity to make recommendations, and based on the same procedures, the Party could accept individuals who had arrived in Estonia from the Soviet Union.
During the open door period, a number of unsuitable people ended up in the Party, and already in November-December of 1940, a purge of the ranks took place in the course of issuing new Party membership cards. 500600 people were left behind the Partys doors. As of January 1, 1941, the ECP had 1,169 members, and 867 candidates, for a total of 2,036 Communists, of whom 75% were Estonian, 23% Russian, and 2% of other nationalities. By June 1, 1941, 3,732 Party members were registered in Estonia, of them 2,576 enrolled by the ECP (including those coming from the Soviet Union and joining the Party in Estonia) and 1,156 Communists that had arrived from the Soviet Union.
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